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Abstract1—Cooperative multihop communication can greatly increase network throughput, yet 
packet forwarding for other nodes involves opportunity and energy cost for relays. Thus one of the 
pre-requisite problems in the successful implementation of multihop transmission is how to foster 
cooperation among selfish nodes. Existing researches mainly adopt monetary stimulating. In this 
manuscript, we propose instead a simple and self-enforcing forwarding incentive scheme free of 
indirect monetary remunerating for asymmetric (uplink multihop, downlink single-hop) cellar 
network based on coalitional game theory, which comprises double compensation, namely, Inter-
BEA, global stimulating policy allotting resources among relaying coalitions according to group 
size, and Intra-BEA, local compensating and allocating rule within coalitions. Firstly, given the 
global allotting policy, we introduce a fair allocation estimating approach which includes 
remunerating for relaying cost using Myerson value for partition function game, to enlighten the 
design of local allocating rules. Secondly, given the inter- and intra-BEA relay fostering approach, 
we check stability of coalition structures in terms of internal and external stability as well as 
inductive core. Theoretic analysis and numerical simulation show that our measure can provide 
communication opportunities for outer ring nodes and enlarge system coverage, while at the same 
time provide enough motivation with respect to resource allocation and energy saving for nodes in 
inner and middle ring to relay for own profits. 
Index Terms—Multihop cellular networks, Forwarding incentive, Partition 
function game, Restricted cooperation, Myerson value 
1 Introduction 
Multihop cellular network (MCN [1, 3, 4]) is considered as a promising candidate 
of fourth generation (4G) wireless network for future mobile communications. 
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The fundamental idea of multihop communication is to break an original long 
communication link into two or more shorter links, and thus could reduce the 
required transmission power of each node participating in the communication 
scenario. The reduced transmission power could also lead to a lower interference 
level and shorter frequency reuse distance. In addition, the need for short-range 
transmission in MCNs opens the possibility of using other higher data rate 
wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.11, Bluetooth, or Ultra-Wideband 
(UWB), in conjunction with the cellular technology.  
In a MCN, data packets may have to be relayed hop by hop from a given mobile 
station (MS) to a base station (BS) [2]. The sacrifice of a relay is two-
dimensional, namely the opportunity cost [8], associated with sharing own 
bandwidth, and energy loss. In view of this, MSs apparently need tangible 
incentives to cooperate. Most existing researches use monetary pricing and 
economic incentives to foster packet forwarding, though the monetary reward 
may come in different forms: as credit counters in [5], as billing accounts in [6], 
as micro-payment (i.e., electronic tokens) in [7], as a ‘top-up’ of the credit value 
of a smart card in [9], or as a discount in the user subscription price for accessing 
the network [10]. By way of exception, M. Lindstrom etc. proposed to stimulate 
forwarding by pricing and rewarding with the addition of allowing an originating 
source to delegate part of its bandwidth to a relay for forwarding its traffic in [8]; 
Wei Hung-Yu etc. in [26] propose a scheduling algorithm as an incentive 
mechanism for hybrid wireless relay network based on Nash Equilibrium [28]. In 
addition to a central operator that maintains a billing account for each node, these 
economic rewarding methods generally require particular records to be 
maintained and manipulated in each node, thus involve certain security and credit 
problem. Furthermore, due to their indirectness and lag in reward, these measures 
are not suitable in changeful scenes such as emergency and temporary cases with 
frequent entry and quitting.  
The objective of this paper is to design a simple and direct mechanism free of 
indirect monetary rewards to encourage cooperative relay in a MCN system. Our 
approach makes double compensation for potential cost of relays in opportunity 
and energy, i.e., stimulating policies of BS and further rewards from source nodes. 
Firstly, BS announces a resource (e.g., channel) apportioning policy that would 
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allot far more share to relay-source groups than to individual nodes, thus makes it 
profitable for MSs to form relaying groups; secondly, stimulated by the above 
policy, MSs seek to form cooperative groups and source(s)-relay(s) within a group 
can share extra cooperative payoffs (allotted channels) by bargaining, or in some 
fair or stable criteria. In our implementation, multihopping (MH) is self-enforced 
through stimulating policy from the operator and selfish and rational reaction 
from the involved MSs.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes system 
configuration and the global inter-coalition stimulating policy according to group 
size: Inter-BEA. Section 3 introduces our relaying cooperative model and 
analyses its properties. Section 4 estimates possible fair allocation value based on 
compensated Myerson value and proposes a feasible local resource allotting rule 
within coalitions given BS policy: Intra-BEA. We then discuss in Section 5 which 
cooperation structure is preferred under given BEA allocation approach. We 
propose coalition formation algorithm and numerical results in Section 6, so as to 
examine effectiveness of the proposed incentive measure. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
2 System configuration & global policy 
2.1 Asymmetrical MCN based on OFDMA 
As uplink coverage in a cellular system is limited by power of the terminals, 
cellular coverage is typically asymmetrical in up- and downlink. Consider an 
asymmetrical MCN (single-hop down-link, multi-hop up-link) shown as Fig.1, 
suppose that the infrastructure is capable of providing universal coverage for area 
(radii of the area denoted as BSr ) of all three rings, while uplink coverage is the 
inner two rings (only MSs in this area can reach BS with a single-hop direct 
connection, though they may choose multihop for the sake of saving energy). MSs 
in outer ring can only reach BS by multihop through MSs in inner or middle ring.  
Assume that the MCN system is orthogonal frequency division multiple access 
(OFDMA) based. To foster relaying cooperation and thereby improve coverage, 
BS announces an apportioning policy that allotting sub-channels according to 
cooperative group size (suppose in sheer single-hop (SH) mode, BS apportions all 
available sub-channels among all reachable active MSs (i.e., those within inner 
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and middle ring, to equalize their share). In MCN mode, apart from SH 
transmitting, the system also allows following uplink modes: 3-hop transmitting 
(e.g., CIV in Fig.1, i.e., relaying cooperation among 3 MSs in inner, middle and 
outer ring respectively) and 2-hop transmitting, including type CI (cooperation 
between MSs in inner and middle ring respectively), type CII (between MSs in 
middle and outer ring) and CIII (between MSs in inner and outer ring). 
2.2 Proposed Inter-coalition incentive strategy: Inter-BEA  
Generally speaking, a global resource policy aims at encouraging cooperation 
should meet two metrics, namely efficient (i.e., it should be able to make the most 
of all available resource) and effective (i.e., it should be able to provide 
cooperating motivation for nodes in the system). Intuitively, nodes will prefer to 
stay (or join in) a group as long as 1n n>D D (i.e., a node can averagely get more in 
a group than staying as a singleton), namely, such an apportioning policy is 
effective. Denote the amount of resources allotted to a group of size n (i.e., it has 
n members) as nD , we propose an incentive measure as follows: Normalize the 
total resources (number of sub-channels) in the system to 1, and assume that all 
sub-channels are apportioned among all active and reachable MSs. For feasible 
group size (1, 2,3)sz = supported by the system, BS allots resources (i.e. sub-
channels) according to ratio: 
1 2 3: : 1: 3 : 7=D D D  1 2 3(2 1) : (2 1) : (2 1)= − − −                             ⑴ 
We call the policy represented by Eq. (1) the Inter-coalition Binary Exponential 
Apportioning (Inter-BEA) mechanism. We comment that our approach is 
inherently efficient considering the above assumption, and we will further 
examine its effectiveness in subsection 3.1 by theorem 1 (in the sense of negative 
externality and no free-ride), in Section 5 (in the sense of coalition structure 
stability) and in Section 6 by simulation. 
It’s worth to point out that although we only present our research in terms of 
OFDMA in particular, Our incentive mechanism is in fact general enough to be 
applied in systems such as TDMA or CDMA, either by means of sub-slotting; i.e. 
the basic resource unit, the time-slot, is divided into source and relay subslots, or 
by means of sub-coding and multi-code transmissions.  
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Assume that MSs are all rational and selfish in that each of them would like to 
obtain more sub-channels and cost less energy. Given the apportioning policy of 
the BS, MSs in the outer ring would seek to find possible relays in middle or inner 
ring, so as to secure some communication opportunity; those in the inner ring 
would choose if they will relay for others and MSs in the middle ring can weigh 
the alternatives of whether or not to relay for MSs in outer ring, and whether or 
not to seek possible help from MSs in inner ring.  
 
Figure1. An uplink multihop cellular network 
3 Relaying cooperation game model & analyzing 
3.1 Restricted relaying cooperation in partition function form  
Under the particular configuration and Inter-group apportioning policy, rough 
examination shows that our model bears the following characteristics: 
Restricted cooperation [12, 15, 16, 19, 23]. Since a source and its direct relay 
must within each other’s transmission range, apparently a node can only cooperate 
with those falling within its neighbor area. Games with restricted cooperation 
describe situations in which the players are not completely free in forming 
coalitions; the restrictions in our model are mainly attributed to topology, namely 
the relative position of MSs. To manage these situations, a coalition set is 
generally introduced to represent the set of all feasible cooperative groups among 
the nodes. 
Externalities [17, 20]: Noted that given the apportioning policy in Eq. (1), the 
action of merging (relaying coalition formation) among 2 or 3 MSs will affect 
payoffs of those nodes not involved in the mergence. These externalities can be 
captured in the framework of partition function game (PFG) [25] quite easily. 
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There can be two special cases of externalities: positive and negative externalities, 
meaning that when a mergence occurs, all the players who are not involved in a 
mergence are better (worse) off, more formally, 
Definition 1(Positive/negative externality games[11,13,22,24]) the following 
condition characterizes a positive (negative) externality game: Assume that CS 
'π was created from CS '≠π π by a mergence of certain (possibly also trivial) 
coalitions that consist of k players, k∈N .If the allocation function (.)φ is defined 
in  terms of payoffs: ( ') ( )i iφ φ≥π π ( ( ') ( ))i iφ φ≤π π , \i k∀ ∈N . 
Combining the above judgment, we conclude that our model pertains to a kind of 
PFG with restricted cooperation, and we introduce a set of feasible embedded 
coalitions into a general PFG model to denote this restriction, this result in the 
following definition:   
 Definition 2(RPFG—Relaying PFG) A RPFG can be represented as ( , , , )G v φN Ε , 
in which N denotes the set of MSs in MCN system shown in Fig.1, and 
1 1( ) {{ ,..., } | , ; }
m
m i j i ii j == ∩ = ≠ ∪ =Π N C C C C Φ C N  the set of feasible coalition 
structures (CS). A pair E(C, π) with ∈C π  and ( )π ∈Π N is called an embedded 
coalition (EC) and the set of feasible embedded coalitions is denoted by ( )Ε N . The 
partition function v assigns a value to every feasible embedded 
coalition : ( )v →Ε N R according to apportioning policy in Eq. (1). An allocation 
rule is a function : ( , )v Rφ → NΕ  such that ( , ) ( )ii E v Eφ =∑ V for all v and E.  
Feasible coalitions in the RPFG model corresponding to the three type of feasible 
uplink transmitting mode mentioned in Sect. 2, namely single-hop, 2-hop and 3-
hop transmission, hereafter also referred as singleton coalition (SC), double 
coalition (DC) and triple coalition (TC). To be noted that the value v(C, π) of the 
embedded coalition (C, π) is the payoff that the players in C can distribute among 
themselves in case the CS π forms. In other words, payoff is assumed to be 
transferable ([14] TU) within embedded coalitions, but nontransferable (NTU) 
between them. Through further examination, we reach the following conclusion 
about our RPFG model: 
Theorem 1: For the non-trivial case of | | 2n = >N , the RPFG model defined in 
definition 2 is a negative externality game as a whole. 
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose that before a mergence, the number of SC, DC and 
TC in the system are 1n , 2n and 3n , 1 2 32, 0, 0n n n≥ ≥ ≥ . According to apportioning 
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policy (1), available sub-channels are divided into 1 1 2 2 3 3m n n n= + +D D D  
1 2 33 7n n n= + + , i.e., the allotting unit is 1/ mσ = .  
There can be all together 4 kinds of mergence: CI ~ CIV in Fig.1, in which CII ~ 
CIV involve an introduction of a MS within the outer ring (which is originally not 
an active node) while CI type not.  
Firstly, if the mergence belongs to a CI type, before merging, the sub-channels 
allotted to the 2 involved nodes sum to P 2σ= . After the merging, the number of 
SC, DC and TC become '1 1 2n n= − , '2 2 1n n= +  and '3 3n n=  respectively, 
' ' '
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3' 3 7 1m n n n n n n= + + = + + +D D D , ' 1/ 'mσ = , the sub-channels allotted to the 
newly formed DC (by the 2 merged nodes) are 2P' ' 3 'σ σ= =D .Solve 'P P> ,we get 
1 2 33 7 2n n n+ + > .,this can always be satisfied under the condition of 
| | 2n = >N ( 1 2 32, 0n n n> = = or 1 2 32, 0n n n= × > ), i.e., P' is always greater than P, 
meaning that the mergence brings positive gain in payoffs for the involved 
members in a whole, since all available sub-channels are (normalized to)1, the 
payoffs to the residual nodes that not involved in the mergence apparently 
decrease after the merging.  
Secondly, if the mergence belongs to CII or CIII type, before merging, the sub-
channels allotted to the involved nodes are P σ=  (the node in outer ring is not 
reachable under SH and thus gets no sub-channels). After the merging, the 
number of SC, DC and TC become '1 1 1n n= − , '2 2 1n n= +  and '3 3n n= , 
' ' '
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3' 3 7 2m n n n n n n= + + = + + +D D D , ' 1/ 'mσ = , the sub-channels allotted to the 
newly formed DC (by the 2 merged nodes) are 2P' ' 3 'σ σ= =D . .Solve 'P P> , we get 
1 2 33 7 1n n n+ + > ,this can always be satisfied under the condition of | | 2n = >N , i.e., 
P' is always greater than P, from now on the proof is similar to the CI case.  
Lastly, if the mergence belongs to CIV type, before merging, the sub-channels 
allotted to the involved nodes are P 2σ=  (the node in outer ring gets no sub-
channels while the one in inner and middle ring each gets P σ= ). After the 
merging, the number of SC, DC and TC become '1 1 2n n= − , '2 2n n=  and '3 3 1n n= + , 
' ' '
1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3' 3 7 5m n n n n n n= + + = + + +D D D , ' 1/ 'mσ = , the sub-channels allotted to the 
newly formed TC (by the 3 merged nodes) are 3' ' 7 'P σ σ= =D . Solve 'P P> , we get 
1 2 33 7 1n n n+ + > as in CII and CIII, from now on the proof is same as the CII and 
CIII case. This concludes the proof. ■   
8 
It’s well known in cooperative game theory domain that in a negative externality 
game there are no opportunities for nodes that don’t cooperate to free-ride [11, 
17]; this property provides motivation for nodes to form coalition. 
3.2 Examples of three- and five-node cases  
Consider the case when there are only three active nodes (i.e., |N|=3 and we only 
consider the special case of MS1, MS2 and MS3 as shown in fig. 1 here, each 
locates on the respective ring boundary) in the system, then the respective channel 
apportioning for all feasible ECs, i.e., the partition functions of 
game ( , , , )G v φN Ε are given as follows:  
(1,2,3) (1/ 2,1/ 2,0)=v ; (12,3) (1,0)=v ; (1,23) (1/ 4,3 / 4)=v ; (13, 2) (3 / 4,1/ 4)=v ; 
(123) (1)=v                                                        ⑵ 
In which zeros in (1,2,3)v and (12,3)v  indicate that when no nodes relay for MS3, it 
can’t reach BS by itself and gets no resources, so MS1 and MS2 have all the 
channels between them.  
For the case when there are five nodes (i.e., |N|=5 and we only consider the 
special case of MS1~MS5 as shown in fig. 1 here, each locates on the respective 
ring boundary), the partition functions for all feasible CSs 1 2{ ( , )}= =Π π π π  are 
shown in Tab. 1, in which e.g., 3 1 1 1(13,2,4,5) ( , , , )
6 6 6 6
=v . 
Table 1. Partition function values for |N|=5 with Inter-BEA 
1π  ( )v π  
1,2,3  12,3  13,2  1,23  123  
4,5  1 1 1 1, ,0, ,
4 4 4 4
3 1 1,0, ,
5 5 5
3 1 1 1, , ,
6 6 6 6
1 3 1 1, , ,
6 6 6 6
 7 1 1, ,
9 9 9
 
 
2π  
45  1 1 3, ,0,
5 5 5
 1 1,0,
2 2
 3 1 3, ,
7 7 7
 1 3 3, ,
7 7 7
 7 3,
10 10
 
4 What a fair Allocation should be - Prediction 
Up to now, we have only proposed an allotting policy among coalitions for our 
MCN system, whether or not nodes will form relaying coalitions, and further 
which cooperative structure will be formed depends on how the worth v is divided 
among the nodes. Thus besides the inter-coalition policy, we also have to find an 
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intra-coalition allocating mechanism. To get some insight in this, we would firstly 
try making some point prediction. 
4.1 Prediction by Myerson value (MV) for PFG 
The Shapley value (SV) [21] has been proven to be a useful solution concept for 
cooperative characteristic function TU games [25] (CFG, a special coalitional 
game without externalities) as it provides a recommendation for the division of 
the joint profits of the grand coalition, which assigns a unique allocation to each 
game, expresses compromise or average allocation and satisfies some reasonable 
properties. 
The counterpart of SV for PFG was first proposed By R.B. Myerson [24], who 
showed that there exists the unique value which satisfies efficiency, symmetry and 
any one of the marginality axioms. The principle of marginality in PFG which 
states that one player’s payoff should be calculated according to his marginal 
contribution. MV of PFG is defined as [24]: 
| | 1
( , ) ( ) ,
1 1 1( ) ( 1) (| | 1)!( ) ( ,  )
| | | | 1 |N|-| |
MV
i
p i
v vφ −
∈ ∋ ≠ ∈ ∉
= − − − −∑ ∑πC π E(N) C C Cπ C πN π C% % %              ⑶ 
For N=3, the number of all possible CSs | ( ) | 5=Π N , the number of all possible 
ECs | ( ) | 10=Ε N . By Eq. (3) we get 
MV ( ) (11/ 24,11/ 24,1/12) (0.458,0.458,0.083)= =Φ v                           ⑷ 
For N=5, the number of feasible CSs | ( ) | 10=Π N , and the number of feasible 
ECs | ( ) | 35=Ε N .Also by Eq. (3) we get  
MV ( ) (0.254,0.254,0.0808,0.2056,0.2056)=Φ v                                ⑸ 
4.2 Prediction by Compensated Myerson Value (CMV)  
Observe that under the MV mechanism in sub-section 4.1, payoff of MS1 in Eqs. 
(4) and (5) equals to that of MS2 and that of MS4 in Eq. (5) equals to MS5. We 
don’t think this fair for our model as nodes in inner ring (e.g., MS1, MS4) 
generally cost more in relaying than those in middle ring. We in this sub-section 
design a way of compensation for forwarding cost on the basis of the MV 
prediction of sub-section 4.1.  
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Assume that each node uses equal compensation weight 0λ ≥ and i jφ λφΔ = means 
that node i gets jλφ  additional Remuneration for its energy cost  when it relays 
jφ  for node j. Introducing an indicator function as follows
1,      
1,      
0,   
ij
i relays for j
I j relays for i
otherwise
⎧⎪= −⎨⎪⎩
, 
and we define the MV after Compensation as: 
CC | | 1 CC
( , ) ,( ) ,
1 1 1( ) ( 1) (| | 1)!( )( ( ,  ) )
| | | | 1 |N|-| |i ij ji jp i
v v Iφ φ−
∈ ∈∋ ≠ ∈ ∉
= − − − +−∑ ∑ ∑πC π E(N) CC C Cπ C πN π C% % %       ⑹ 
By Eq. (6) we get the CMV with respect to λ for |N|=3 as shown in Eq. (7) and 
Fig. 2.   
CC CC CC
1 2 3
CC
2
CC
3
1 ( (123,{123}) ( ))
3
1 1( (12,{12,3}) ) (3,{12,3})
6 3
1 1( (13,{13,2}) ) (2,{13, 2})
6 3
2 1(1,{1,23}) (23,{1, 23})
3 3
1 1 1(2,{1,2,3}) (3,{1,2,3}) (1,{1, 2,3})
6 6 3
v
v v
v v
v v
v v v
φ λ φ φ
λφ
λφ
= + +
+ + −
+ + −
+ −
+ + −
, 
CC CC CC
2 2 3
CC
2
CC
3
1 ( (123,{123}) ( ))
3
1 1( (12,{12,3}) ) (3,{12,3})
6 3
1 1( (23,{1, 23}) ) (1,{1, 23})
6 3
2 1(2,{13, 2}) (13,{13,2})
3 3
1 1 1(1,{1, 2,3}) (3,{1, 2,3}) (2,{1, 2,3})
6 6 3
v
v v
v v
v v
v v v
φ λ φ φ
λφ
λφ
= + − +
+ − −
+ + −
+ −
+ + −
 
CC CC
3 3
CC
3
CC
3
1 ( (123,{123}) 2 )
3
1 1( (13,{13,2}) ) (2,{13,2})
6 3
1 1( (23,{1, 23}) ) (1,{1,23})
6 3
2 1(3,{12,3}) (12,{12,3})
3 3
1 1 1(1,{1, 2,3}) (2,{1,2,3}) (3,{1, 2,3})
6 6 3
v
v v
v v
v v
v v v
φ λφ
λφ
λφ
= −
+ − −
+ − −
+ −
+ + −
, 
3
2
1 2 3
1
12(1+ )
11+12
12(1+ )(2 )
1
φ λ
λφ λ λ
φ ϕ ϕ
⎧ =⎪⎪⎪ =⎨ +⎪⎪ = − −⎪⎩
               ⑺ 
0 5 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Compensation Factor
P
ay
of
fs Node 3
Node 2
Node 1
 
Figure 2. Payoff of each MS predicted by CMV vs. compensation weight λ for |N|=3 
We see from Fig.2 that there in fact can be many ways of tradeoff in payoff 
allocation when compensation for relaying cost is taken into consideration.  
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4.3 Proposed intra-coalition compensation scheme: Intra-BEA 
Though Myerson value given in Sect.4 can provide some insight in fair payoff 
allocation, yet in a practical system where there are many nodes, MV-like payoff 
allocating methods are not flexible, owing to the complexity and rigid Inter-
dependence among all nodes. In fact it’s even not applicable in our system, as on 
the one hand, it’s difficult for a MS to know exactly the global apportioning so as 
to calculate the fair MV, on the other hand, payoffs are not transferable among 
coalitions inside a particular CS. To overcome this drawback, we propose the 
following distributed intra-coalition allocation method which only requires local 
knowledge. 
In a multihop uplink coalition, let the source, relay-I and relay-II (e.g. MS3, MS2 
and MS1 in CIV in fig.1) share channels in ratio 
0 1 2
3 2 1: : 1: 2 : 4 2 : 2 : 2= =h h h                                         ⑻ 
We refer Eq. (8) as the Rule of Intra-coalition Binary Exponential Allocation 
(Intra-BEA). Given the system configuration and global policy Inter-BEA in 
Section 2, this local rule can be physically understood as follows: without loss of 
generality suppose 1 1=D , then according to Inter-BEA Eq. (1), a CIV-like 
coalition whose size is 3 gets 7 sub-channels totally, then MS1 can transmit to BS 
on all of them, in which 4 of them are traffics of its own, 2 are traffics of MS2, 
and 1 of them is MS3’s. A DC type coalition (such as CI, CII and CIII in fig. 1 
whose size is 2) gets 3 sub-channels, then traffics of the helping node and the 
helped one occupy 2 and 1 respectively. One interpretation of this Intra-BEA rule 
is that ‘You reap what you sow’, i.e., each active node originally has one share of 
sub-channels, relay-I gets one extra reward (sub-channel) for forwarding on one 
sub-channel for the source and relay-II acquires 3 extra rewards for forwarding on 
3 sub-channels (one for the source and the other two for relay-I), hence we get Eq. 
(8). Using Inter- and Intra-BEA, i.e., referring to Eq. (2), Tab.1 and Eq. (8) to the 
case of |N|=3 and |N|=5, we have the payoff of each node (per-membership 
allocation) for |N|=3 in Tab.2 and |N|=5 in Tab.4. ‘Total-traffic’ in Tab.3 and 5 
means all the sub-channels a node need to transmit on, including self-traffics and 
those it relays for others. 
Table 2. Payoff/self-traffic ( )iφ π of each node vs. CS for |N|=3 with Inter- & Intra-BEA 
Payoff MS1 MS2 MS3
12 
1,2,3 1/2 1/2 0 
12,3 2/3 1/3 0 
13,2 1/2 1/4 1/4
1,23 1/4 1/2 1/4
123 4/7 2/7 1/7
Table 3. Total-traffic ( )it π of each node vs. CS for |N|=3 with Inter- & Intra-BEA 
Total MS1 MS2 MS3
1,2,3 1/2 1/2 0 
12,3 1 1/3 0 
13,2 3/4 1/4 1/4
1,23 1/4 3/4 1/4
123 1 3/7 1/7
Table 4. Payoff/self-traffic ( )iφ π of each node vs. CS for |N|=5 with Inter- & Intra-BEA 
1π  
Payoff 
1,2,3  12,3  13,2  1,23  123  
4,5  1 1 1 1, ,0, ,
4 4 4 4  
2 1 1 1, ,0, ,
5 5 5 5
2 1 1 1 1, , , ,
6 6 6 6 6
1 2 1 1 1, , , ,
6 6 6 6 6
 4 2 1 1 1, , , ,
9 9 9 9 9
 
2π  
45  1 1 2 1, ,0, ,
5 5 5 5
 1 1 1 1, ,0, ,
3 6 3 6
2 1 1 2 1, , , ,
7 7 7 7 7
1 2 1 2 1, , , ,
7 7 7 7 7
 4 2 1 2 1, , , ,
10 10 10 10 10
Table 5. Total-traffic ( )it π of each node vs. CS for |N|=5 with Inter- & Intra-BEA 
1π  
Total 
1,2,3  12,3  13,2  1,23  123  
4,5  1 1 1 1, ,0, ,
4 4 4 4  
3 1 1 1, ,0, ,
5 5 5 5
3 1 1 1 1, , , ,
6 6 6 6 6
1 3 1 1 1, , , ,
6 6 6 6 6
 7 3 1 1 1, , , ,
9 9 9 9 9
 
2π  
45  1 1 3 1, ,0, ,
5 5 5 5
 1 1 1 1, ,0, ,
2 6 2 6
3 1 1 3 1, , , ,
7 7 7 7 7
1 3 1 3 1, , , ,
7 7 7 7 7
 7 3 1 3 1, , , ,
10 10 10 10 10
5 CS Stability with respect to the Inter- & Intra-BEA 
allocation mechanism 
Given apportioning and compensating schemes in Sect. 2 and 4, we are interested 
in which CS is stable, if any, i.e., what coalitions the nodes would like to form. 
The stability of a CS is justified in terms of Internal and external stability [13] for 
|N|=3 and inductive core [18, 22] for |N|=5.  
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5.1 Utilities of nodes given Inter- & Intra-BEA  
It should be pointed out that payoffs in form of sub-channels allocated alone are 
not sufficient to represent the gain and loss of a MS in the game, as the 
introduction of multihop affects the transmitting power ( )ip π , and further the 
energy cost ( )ic π of each involved MS i, which equals to the product of ( )ip π  and 
( )it π ,i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )i i ic p t=π π π .   
To be noted again that MS1~MS5 all locate on respective ring boundary. Assume 
that channel gain of a MS i is modeled by ai ih r−= [27], in which ir  is the distance 
between MS i and BS. Then the respective channel power gain 2 2a| |i ih r−= . Further 
assume that each ring ( IR , MR  and OR ) in fig. 1 has equal width, i.e., 
1
3I M O BS
w w w r= = = and 2a = . Assume perfect power control, BS and all MSs use 
same modulation schemes, if we normalize the transmitting power (needed in one 
sub-channel for successful receiving) of a node on the outer boundary of MR  
(e.g., MS2) when transmitting directly to BS to 1, then the necessary transmitting 
power of MS2 in one sub-channel when communicating to MS1 is only 42− . We 
get transmitting power of each node in all feasible CSs for |N|=3 as shown in tab. 
6, and for |N|=5 in tab.7.  
Table 6. Transmitting power ( )ip π of each node vs. CS for |N|=3 
Power MS1 MS2 MS3
1,2,3 42− 1 0 
12,3 42− 42− 0 
13,2 42− 1 1 
1,23 42− 1 42−
123 42− 42− 42−
Table 7. Transmitting power ( )ip π of each node vs. CS for |N|=5 
1π  
Power 
1,2,3  12,3  13,2  1,23  123  
4,5  -4 -42 ,1,0, 2 ,1  -4 -4 -42 ,2 ,0,2 ,1 -4 -42 ,1,1, 2 ,1 -4 -4 -42 ,1, 2 ,2 ,1  -4 -4 -4 -42 ,2 ,2 , 2 ,1
2π  
45  -4 -4 -42 ,1,0, 2 ,2  -4 -4 -4 -42 ,2 ,0,2 ,2 -4 -4 -42 ,1,1,2 ,2 -4 -4 -4 -42 ,1, 2 , 2 , 2  -4 -4 -4 -4 -42 ,2 , 2 , 2 ,2
Apparently, each node cares not only gains in payoff but also loss in energy. They 
would like to get more sub-channels (payoffs) with less energy cost. Accordingly, 
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we define the utility ( )iU π of MS i as the weighted difference between its payoff 
(sub-channels allocated) ( )iv π and its energy cost ( )ic π : 
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )i i iU cρφ ρ= − −π π π , 0 1ρ< <                                    ⑼ 
From tab. 2, tab.3 and tab.6, by Eq. (9), we find utility of each node for |N|=3 as 
shown in tab. 7, and from tab.4, tab.5 and tab.8 we find utility in five-node case as 
shown in tab. 9. Note that there appear negative utilities in both table, e.g., 
2 (1,23) 0.125U = − , 2 (1,23, 4,5) 0.083U = −  and 2 (1,23, 4,5) 0.071U = − . These should 
indicate that in these cases, the energy cost of MS2 is so large that its gains in 
payoffs are not enough to countervail it.  
Table 8. Utility ( )iU π of each node vs. CS for |N|=3 with Inter- & Intra-BEA 
Utility MS1 MS2 MS3
1,2,3 0.234 0 0 
12,3 0.302 0.156 0 
13,2 0.227 0 0 
1,23 0.117 -0.125 0.117
123 0.254 0.129 0.067
Table 9. Utility ( )iU π of each node vs. CS for |N|=5 with Inter- & Intra-BEA 
1π  
Utility 
1,2,3  12,3  13,2  1,23  123  
4,5  
0.117, 0, 0 
0.117, 0 
0.181, 0.094, 0
0.094, 0 
0.151, 0, 0 
0.078, 0 
.078, -.083, .078 
0.078, 0 
0.198, 0.101, 0.052
0.052, 0 
2π  
45  
0.094, 0, 0 
0.181, 0.094 
0.151, 0.078, 0
0.151, 0.078
0.129, 0, 0 
0.129, 0 
.067, -.071, .067 
0.129, 0.067 
.178, .091, .047
0.091, 0.047 
5.2 CS stability for |N|=3 
It’s apparent that all CSs for |N|=3 are single-agreement CS (in which there is only 
one (non-trivial) coalition), so we can investigate its stability based on the 
conception of internal and external stability [13]. A CS is said to be stable if it is 
both internally and externally stable. 
Definition 3 (Internal and external stability) A CS : [ | singletons]=π C is: 
(a) Internally stable if and only if ([ | singletons]) ([ | singletons | ]),  i i iU U i i−≥ ∀ ∈C C C ; 
and 
(b) Externally stable if and only if -([ | singletons]) ([ { } | singletons ])i i iU U i< ∪C C , 
singletonsi∀ ∈ . 
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Firstly referring to Tab.8 we see that while [1 | 23]  is the best choice of MS3, it is 
the last choice of MS2, and so it’s not internally stable. MS2 would break 
from[1| 23] to form [1|2|3] and further to cooperate with MS1 to form [12|3], which 
is the best choice for both MS1 and MS2, indicating that this CS is internally 
stable. CS [13 | 2] is not internally stable similarly as [1 | 23] . It’s noticeable that 
though the grand coalition[123]  isn’t internally stable, it’s the second best choice 
for all the members.  
5.3 CS stability for |N|=5  
For |N|=5, as there can be more than one non-trivial coalition in a particular CS, 
the model belongs to multiple-agreement games and stability conceptions like 
Internal and external stability aren’t applicable here[13]. We adopt instead the 
inductive Core [18, 22] to investigate stability of multiple-agreement CS in this 
case.  
Informally, the core [22, 23] is the set of un-dominated allocations. An allocation 
is not in the core if there is a coalition that can profitably deviate from it. In PFGs 
a deviation by a coalition or a set of coalitions typically affects the payoffs of the 
residual players thus invoking a response from them. Such a response can change 
the worth of the deviation dramatically. L, Kóczy in [18, 22] defines a Core C+ by 
induction based on a dominance in which residuals form an allocation that is a 
member of the core in the residual subgame in a reaction to a deviation. Formally, 
the definition consists of four steps: 
Definition 4 (the inductive Core C+) 
1. Trivial game. Let ( , , , )G v φN Ε  be a PFG game. The core of a game with N = 
{1} is the only allocation with the trivial CS: ({1}, ) {( (1, (1)), (1)}v v+ =C . 
2. Inductive assumption. Given the definition of the Core ( , )v+C R , in 
which \=R N C are the set of residual nodes for every game with at most k + 1 
nodes, we can define dominance for a game of k players. Let ( , )v+A R denote the 
optimistic assumption about the game ( , , , )G v φR RR Ε . If ( , )v+ ≠ ΦC R then 
( , ) ( , )v v+ +=A R C R otherwise ( , ) ( , )v v+ += ΩA R R , i.e., all the feasible allocation 
vectors. 
3. Dominance. The allocation ( , )x π  is dominated via the coalition C forming CS 
π if there exists an assumption \( , ) ( \ , )vφ π +∈N C R CA N C and an allocation 
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\(( , ), )φ φ π πC N C C RU  such that  >  xφ C . The allocation ( , )x π  is dominated if it is 
dominated via a coalition. 
4. Core. The core of a game of k players is the set of un-dominated allocations 
and we denote it by ( , )v+C N . 
Referring to Tab.9, same as three-node case, we see that while CS [1 | 23 | 4 | 5]  is 
the best choice of MS3, it’s the last choice of MS2; the case of CS[1| 23 | 4 | 5]  is 
similar. Note that CS[123 | 4 | 5]  pertains to single-agreement CS and is internally 
stable for all members in EC (123,[123 | 4 | 5]) , which is the best choice of MS1, MS2 
and MS3. CS[1| 2 | 3 | 45] is just a counterpart of [123 | 4 | 5]  in that it’s the best 
choice of MS4 and MS5. From Tab.9 it’s apparent that when MS1, MS2 and MS3 
choose to form coalition {123}, the best response of the residual nodes (i.e., MS4 
and MS5) is to form coalition {45}, which results in CS[123 | 45] , namely, the 
inductive Core of the five-node PFG. 
To conclude, for |N|=3, CS[12 | 3]  is internally stable; CS[123]  is the second best 
choice for all its members. For |N|=5, CS[123 | 45]  is the inductive Core as well as 
the second best choice for all the nodes. This shows that our BEA incentive 
measure is indeed effective in these special cases. 
6 Simulation and numerical results  
In the former sections we focus on special cases such as nodes all located on the 
boundaries (e.g., MS1~MS5 in Fig.1).In this section, we examine the applicability 
and efficiency (in terms of network connectivity and nodes’ payoff and energy 
cost etc.) of the proposed BEA stimulating approach in more general cases (more 
nodes, random location) by means of simulation. The problems that we try to 
answer in this section are, firstly from the point of the system, on what scale can 
the proposed scheme improve connectivity? Secondly from the view of individual 
node, what is the gain and loss to cooperate in terms of payoff and energy cost?  
6.1 Simulation configuration 
Consider a cell with BS centered at the origin and MSs uniformly distributed in 
the area. The number of MSs in the inner, middle and outer ring 
(abbreviated IR , MR , OR  respectively) is denoted as ( , 1 ~ 3)jM j= =M and the 
number of SC, DC and TC is denoted as ( , 1 ~ 3)iN i= =N . According to allotting 
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policy (1), we have 31 2 3 12 3 jjN N N M=+ + = ∑  and 3 1 1i ii N= =∑ D .We use the same 
channel model as in sub-section 5.1 and some default simulation parameters are 
given in Tab.10.  
Table 10. Simulation parameters 
Parameters Value 
Cell diameter (m) D=500 
Ring width (m) D/6 
Service Area diameter (m) 1.1D/3 
Variance of Gaussian noise 0N (dbW) -133 
Path loss exponent α 2 
SNR threshold of successful decoding (dB) 10 
Number of MSs 60 
Realizations of Monte Carlo simulation 50 
6.2 Coalition formation algorithm 
As coalitions of CIII type are always dominated by those of CIV type (referring to 
CS[13 | 2]  vs. CS[123]  in Tab.8 and CS[13 | 2 | ...]vs. CS[123 | ...]  in Tab.9), we omit 
this kind of coalitions in the coalition formation. Given Inter- and Intra-BEA in 
sub-section 2.2 and 4.3, assume that nodes in inner and middle ring are always 
willing to forward (for those applicants fall within their service area, which are 
disks centered at the respective relays) and they form coalition according to rules 
as follows: 
As source, a node in outer or middle ring broadcasts its request, and then chooses 
from the respondents the one with best channel. 
As relay, a node in inner or middle ring will accept a request if the applicant 
located within its service area and it has not yet form a coalition with any source. 
6.3 Monte Carlo simulation 
We define network connectivity as the ratio of the number of nodes which can 
reach BS to the total number of nodes in the system, the efficiency of a node as the 
ratio of its payoff to its energy cost, and the MCN relative efficiency of a node as 
the ratio of its efficiency in MCN to its efficiency in a single-hop network. We 
investigate the above performance metrics in terms of various nodes’ density (i.e., 
number of nodes), size of service area and ring width. ‘Width of service area’ 
which denoted as (2, 21/10, 11/5, 12/5, 3) in fig. 3(b) and 6, 7 are the ratio to ring 
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width (500/6m), so the real values are (166. 7, 175.0, 183.3, 200. 0, 250.0) 
respectively. ‘I’ and ‘M’ in Fig.4~9 denotes nodes in inner and middle ring 
respectively, ‘M-CIV’ denotes nodes locate in middle ring who take part in 
coalitions of CIV type. 
Table 11. Difference in ring width in fig. 3(c) and 8, 9 vs. width of inner, middle and outer ring 
difference inner middle outer 
-1/16 114.5833 83.3333 52.0833 
-1/32 98.9583 83.3333 67.7083 
0 83.3333 83.3333 83.3333 
1/32 67.7083 83.3333 98.9583 
1/16 52.0833 83.3333 114.5833 
Network connectivity 
 In fig.3, ‘gain of coop’ denotes the connectivity difference between cooperative 
and non-cooperative models. It can be seen that our scheme can generally 
provides about 20% improvement, and it works better when the number of nodes 
increase, or when relays set service area bigger, or when the inner ring is wider 
than outer ring. Note that improvement in connectivity also represents how many 
nodes in outer ring benefit form forwarding cooperation and thus can set up 
connection with BS. It might be surmised that if we allow more coalition form 
(e.g., a relay can forward for multiple nodes in outer ring), the connectivity can be 
still better.   
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Figure 3. Network connectivity 
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Figure 4. Efficiency vs. number of nodes 
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Figure 5. Relative Efficiency vs. number of nodes
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Efficiency of nodes in inner or middle ring 
We see from Fig.4, 6 and 8 that inner nodes generally have a better efficiency 
with respect to ratio of payoff to energy cost, and the efficiency increases with 
nodes density and service area size, or when outer ring is wider than inner ring. 
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Figure 6. Efficiency vs. service area diameter 
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Figure 7. Relative Efficiency vs. service area diameter
Relative efficiency of nodes in inner or middle ring 
‘All Avg’ in Fig. 5, 7 and 9 denotes the ratio of the average efficiency of all active 
nodes (suppose the number is X) in MCN mode to that of all active nodes 
(suppose the number is Y) in single-hop mode, note that X is greater than Y and 
the difference between them is the number of outer ring nodes that are helped in 
MCN mode. Note that middle inner nodes have the highest gain for participating 
CI type coalitions which should be attributed to the saving in energy for being 
relayed. Note also that nodes in inner and middle ring participating in whatever 
coalitions have a better relative efficiency than that of ‘All Avg’, which includes 
nodes within outer ring and this shows that nodes in outer ring have lowest 
efficiency. The effect of nodes density, service area size and ring width on relative 
efficiency is generally neglectable. 
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Figure 8. Efficiency vs. ring width 
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Figure 9. Relative Efficiency vs. ring width 
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7 Conclusion 
Different from existent researches, we propose an alternative forwarding incentive 
approach dispensed with indirect monetary rewards, which is simple and light 
weighted in terms of implementation and maintenance, thus possibly sheds light 
on stimulating measure design in temporary or emergent circumstances with 
frequent entry and exit. Analysis and simulation results show that our measure can 
achieve some tradeoff between connectivity of nodes in outer ring (i.e., network 
coverage) and utilities of potential relays (i.e., nodes in inner and outer ring). 
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